Putin’s War; Russian DNA

Putin’s War; Russian DNA

(Swallowing a Porcupine)

Introduction

Vladimir Putin launched his war on Ukraine on February 24th. It is the biggest ground war in Europe since the Second World War. Ukraine’s president called the attack a “blatant campaign of terror”, and it is grotesquely unfolding in that manner. A line has been crossed.

Historian Yuval Noah Harari in a recent insightful article in The Economist posed the theory that humanity’s greatest political and moral achievement has been the decline of war. Just maybe the law of the jungle is a choice rather than an inevitability. If this is so, he says then “any leader who chooses to conquer a neighbour will get a special place in humanity’s memory, far worse than your run-of-the-mill Tamerlane. He will go down in history as the man who ruined our greatest achievement. Just when we thought we were out of the jungle, he pulled us back in.”

“If it again becomes normative for powerful countries to wolf down their weaker neighbours, it would affect the way people all over the world feel and behave. The first and most obvious result of a return to the law of the jungle would be a sharp increase in military spending at the expense of everything else. The money that should go to teachers, nurses and social workers would instead go to tanks, missiles and cyber weapons.”

So while, as will be pointed out in the following, there have been justifications and rationalizations that Putin can make for his actions, I believe history, and moral judgement will treat Putin severely. This will not be a condemnation of the Russian people, but of Putin himself and the few enablers in the Russian senior levels of power.

Conclusions and future consequences 

I’ll leap right into my conclusions and observations. My analysis and rationale will be contained in my back-up attachments.

A) The lead-up to the war:

1. This is Putin’s war. He drives all decisions, domestic and international. The war is his calculated risk to reverse Russia’s place in Europe. He rages against a number of affronts: the destruction of the Soviet empire; the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president in 2013; his foes in Ukraine with the claim that they are “neo-Nazis.”; the West’s goal to install pro-Western regimes in former Soviet republics – and on and on. It’s his alternate reality. (Attachment #1: President Vladimir Putin – is an attempt to get his measure, i.e. his motivations, demands, inner circle, and recent Russian military pursuits indicating his lack of humanity) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-1/

2. Russia’s historical DNA has been driven by powerful figures, mostly men. From Vladimir the Great (who converted to Christianity in 988); to Ivan the Terrible (the first Tsar); to the Romanov dynasty (that ruled Russia until the 1917 Revolution; to Peter the Great (who transformed Russia into a European state) and Catherine the Great; to Tsar Alexander II (the Liberator-Tsar); to the revolutionary socialist movement and Lenin (the first and founding head of the Soviet Union); to Stalin (one of the most powerful and murderous dictators in history); to Nikita Khrushchev, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin and finally Putin. (Attachment #2: Russian History – is both a summary of key trends, as well a selection of important events by date) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-2/

3. This is the free world’s fight as much as it is Ukraine’s. A Ukraine victory would be a victory for democracy and the rule of law. History won’t judge the Western world well if Putin prevails over Ukraine. The UN and NATO have to decide how much they care about the values that underpin their institutions and then determine how far they’re prepared to go to defend them.

4. The existential question hovering over this conflict is the fear of a Russian nuclear response; the balance of deterrence has to be restored. The Western world (and I would submit, many other non-aligned states) cannot stomach the wanton killing and destruction of a nation by a cruel murderer, but how far are they prepared to go in its defence because of the fact that Russia have nuclear capability. The dominant perception in Western military circles is that Putin has what’s known as “escalation dominance” because Ukraine matters more to him than it does to the West. David Ignatius of the Washington Post put this problem of asymmetry this way: “a nuclear power (Russia) can engage in vicious regional aggression without paying the most severe price. America and its NATO allies are deterred in this conflict, but Russia isn’t. The paradox of our restraint is that it enables the unrestrained. Somehow, the balance of deterrence must be restored.”

5. Russia’s history has been one of an insecure western border. Witness Napoleon in 1812, Germany in WWII; the great failed disenchantment of the 1990s westernizing experiment; the bringing in of Ukraine as the frontier land of Russia itself etc. (Again see Attachment #2: Russian History) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-2/

6. Russia has been operating on the fringe of moral behaviour in a variety of areas in the past. A pattern of promoting Russian dominance and power has emerged over the past several decades. I note three areas. The first is in their seemingly open contempt for killing (or trying to kill) people who they deem affecting their objectives as a nation. The second area of moral contempt is in the state’s disregard for fair play and a level playing field in sport, using doping techniques that have been proven to enhance athletic performance. The third area is in the business world. Post-Soviet Russia had seen some of the most spectacular investment opportunities in the history of financial markets. Corruption of the oligarchs, the twenty-some-odd men who were reported to have stolen 39% of the country after the fall of communism and who became billionaires almost overnight, was rampant. (See Attachment #3: Russia on the Fringe of Moral Behaviour – read this to expand on these examples.) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-3-4/

7. There are legitimate reasons for countries to reject Russia and want to be part of the European Union (EU). The Russian autocratic, repressive model does not stand up well to a rules based, civil liberty democratic model fashioned by the rule of law; free and fair elections; the freedom to speak, write and assemble; the freedom to worship as one chooses; and the freedom of the press. Also as Poland and other former Soviet republics that joined the EU discovered, great economic transformations can take place. Part of that was helped by structural funds transferred from the wealthy to not-so-wealthy EU members. 

8. Ukraine’s history has been one of violence and tyranny, but they’ve recently chosen democracy instead. When the Soviet Union collapsed, history seemed to guarantee that Ukrainians would again go down the path of brutal tyranny. But they chose differently. Despite history, despite grinding poverty and despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles, Ukrainians established a democracy. When faced with the threat of autocracy in 2004 and 2013, Ukrainians twice rose in revolt to defend their freedom. (See Attachment #4: Ukraine: Violent History and Path to Democracy) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-3-4/

9. Western democracies have not been paying attention to the menace that has been incubating on their eastern frontier. Two decades ago Russia used brutal force to crush Chechen rebels; spies with nerve agents have been murdering exiled Russians; the invasion of Georgia in 2008; Crimea was annexed in 2014 and then the Donbas. For quite some time Putin has been signaling in his words and actions. The evidence has been building for years.

10. Russia broke its promise that the sovereignty of Ukraine would be respected if they gave up their nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Putin has paid absolutely no attention to that promise; for many this is one of the reasons why making peace with him will be difficult. 

11. Western Europe, particularly Germany, has become a virtual slave to Russian oil and gas. With the help of pliant leaders, 40% of Europe’s gas imports and a quarter of its oil came from Russia. Germany (with the particularly pliant chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and his successor Angela Merkel) got so confident that they shut down their entire nuclear generating system over the course of a decade! 

12. Putin’s justification for the war: the idea, that the Soviet Union was tricked in 1989-90 is at the heart of Russia’s confrontation with the west, has support by some, but I feel has shallow merit. The current confrontation between Russia and the west is fuelled by many grievances, but the greatest is the belief in Moscow that the west tricked the former Soviet Union by breaking promises made at the end of the cold war in 1989-1990 that NATO would not expand to the east. But the reality of what happened to Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981, makes nonsense of the claim that NATO expansion eastward caused the current crisis. The West didn’t impose NATO upon Eastern Europeans: the Eastern Europeans demanded it and we would have been derelict not to have provided it. (Attachment #5: The Debate Around NATO Enlargement – as this is pivotal to the arguments Putin is using for his war, I’ve made an attempt at describing what they are) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-5/

13. Putin’s rationale for war depends upon his audience. To the West, Putin wants to stop an eastern march taken by Western powers; to turn Ukraine into a neutral, demilitarized satellite and NATO to withdraw its forces and equipment from Bulgaria and Romania. To the Ukraines, he wants to correct a historical wrong; he wants to reclaim the motherland – the place where the Russian Orthodox Church was born. To his Russian audience, as noted by his March 18 Moscow rally speech, he had an emotional anti-Nazi theme. A sign on the stage read “For a world without Nazism’ under which he railed against his foes in Ukraine with the claim that they are “neo-Nazis.” and insisted that his actions were necessary to prevent “genocide”. This branding of his enemies as Nazis evoked what many Russians consider their country’s finest hour (and greatest sacrifice) – the defence of the motherland from Germany during WWII.

14. Putin, it is speculated, also wants to reverse the demographic collapse of ethnic Russians and promote Russian “innate superiority”. Current projections have the Russian population declining from the present 145 million to 115 by 2050, and that apparently “haunts” Putin. If he annexes a nation he thinks to be “full of Russians denied their true identity” (and not rely on immigration which primarily comes from Muslim dominated Central Asian republics) he will have a purer population. As well, there is a “Rasputin-like character (Aleksander Dugin) who has been influencing Putin with ideas of “Eurasianism” – the concept that Russia belongs at the centre of a New World Order because of its innate superiority. As commentator Diane Francis said in her March 31 blog, these “ideas are creepily similar to Hitler’s ‘super race’ lunacy complete with a desire for worldwide domination.” (See Attachment #6: Russia’s Size, Power and Troubling Demographics – it describes the size of Russia plus some troubling demographic realities.) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-6/

15. A holy war? The link between faith and national identity has not been severed, despite communism suppressing the Russian church for years. Putin is playing this hand: championing the church’s resurgence and defining it as part of a single vision of Russian values, at odds with Western liberal societies. This conflict is being cast, by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church and Putin, as a holy war. Patriarch Kirill, the current head of the Church recently described military service as a “manifestation of evangelical love for neighbours.”(See Attachment #7: The Role of Religion in this Conflict) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-6/

16. Past imperialism cannot justify present day expansionism. 70% of Ukrainians reject the idea that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. History tells us Ukraine was forcefully Russified. Failure to hold Russia to account for irredentism and war will go down in history as morally reprehensible and dangerous. 

B) The war itself (at March end):

1. Putin’s war is not going as well as he anticipated; his war strategy appears to be changing; the war is stalemated but not over. Nearing the end of March Russia has failed to seize any major Ukrainian city. The conflict appears to have devolved into a bloody war of attrition. In a TV interview the former U.S. General David Petraeus believes Russia will be bogged down for a long time because of the courage and cunning of Ukraine’s resistance and said “I don’t think this is a war that Putin can win. He can take a city or two but cannot hold it and urban warfare is intensive and requires more manpower. They hate the Russians.”  Russia has signalled on March 25 that it was scaling back its ambitions to focus on securing the Donbas region.(See Attachment #8: The War Itself From Russia’s Perspective) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-7/

2. Knowing Putin, there is the potential for a more serious downside. An analogy in thinking about Putin that floats around (and appears in some of Putin’s writings) is that of a cornered rat; with no way out it gets vicious – so, is the message “don’t corner a rat?”. One pessimistic scenario is that he will accelerate his invasion by unleashing more artillery attacks, and possibly chemical ones, on the population as he did in Aleppo and in Chechnya. “He won’t hesitate to destroy a city but the difference is this time the world is watching. It wasn’t before,” said a British chemical warfare expert. There are some who feel that Putin has staked his empire on this war, and anything less than the complete occupation of Ukraine could mean his political, and possibly even personal, demise.

3. The Black Sea, the Azov Sea and the strategic ports are critical to Russia’s strategy. The Azov Sea has a long history of involvement in the conflict between Russia and other countries (e.g. Turkey, Britain, France). Severing Ukraine’s access to the Black and Azov seas, would landlock Ukraine and deal a crippling blow to its economy and allow Russia to build a land corridor to Crimea, seized by Moscow in 2014. (See Attachment #8: The War Itself From Russia’s Perspective) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-7/

4. A no-fly zone over Ukraine has been dismissed by NATO. Ukraine is pleading with NATO to enforce a no-fly zone above the country as the Russian military intensifies its aerial bombardment. That request has not been entertained by NATO because enforcement of a no-fly zone could amount to a direct confrontation between NATO and the Russian military. (See Attachment #9: Regarding a No-fly Zone Over Ukraine) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-8/

5. The Ukrainian will to prevail is strong; their defence tactics are proving tenacious. This fight is existential for the country. There is a visceral hate, a sort of “Russophobia” prevalent throughout. Ukrainian forces, starting on March 22, are now fighting to take back territory. (See Attachment #10: The War Itself From Ukraine’s Perspective) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-9-10/

6. Trying to subdue Ukraine will be like “swallowing a porcupine”. Professor John Mearsheimer used those words, and prophetically wrote eight years ago that Russia “lacks the capability to easily conquer and annex eastern Ukraine, much less the entire country…An overwhelming majority of those people want to remain part of Ukraine and would surely resist a Russian occupation…Furthermore, Russia’s mediocre army would have little chance of pacifying all of Ukraine.”

7. A humanitarian nightmare is occurring under the gaze of the whole world. Over 4 million people, primarily women, children, and the elderly (freeing the men to fight at home) have fled Ukraine after four weeks, while another 10 million have been displaced from their homes but remain in Ukraine. Over two million have abandoned the capital, Kyiv.

8. Ukranian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is an unlikely heroic symbol. He has become a symbol of Ukranian resistance and a surprising worthy rival of Putin. He is broadcasting defiant videos while Russian troops close in and missiles smash the capital city of Kyiv. (See Attachment #11; Ukranian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – an Unlikely Heroic Symbol) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-9-10/

9. Sanctions have become effective weapons of war. Pretty much every possible sanction be it legal, economic, or political has now been applied to Russia. (Attachment #12: Sanctions Imposed on Russia by the West) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-11-12-13/

10. A full range of financial sanctions have been implemented; financial actions are capable of being a powerful “weapon” of war. While it still needs to be played out, the financial “full court press” or economic iron curtain applied to Russia should have devastating consequences (to the value of their ruble, to trade, to business financing, to individual finances.) A worldwide suspension of business activity until Moscow ceases is occurring. Economic warfare has been fully embraced as a viable method of dealing with a geo-political conflict. They include blocking some Russian banks from accessing the SWIFT international banking system. Also, those oft-cited Russian “oligarchs” are being clipped. (See Attachment #12: Sanctions Imposed on Russia by the West) and Attachment #13: The Russian “Oligarchs” are Being Clipped) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-11-12-13/

11. Energy restrictions are a weapon of war and have raised the stakes exponentially.The actions being taken against Russia have/will diminish their income sources for conducting this war. A Western oil embargo against Russia raises the stakes exponentially. Oil and gas make up 40% of Russia’s state budget. It is what holds the patronage machine together. (See Attachment #14: Oil and Gas Sanctions) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-11-12-13/

12. The world of international business has lashed out, halting operations, breaking off joint venture partnerships and unwinding investments. A symbolic example is McDonald’s, the company that first opened Russia to the western franchise world just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, have temporarily closed nearly 850 locations. (See Attachment #15: Corporate Response: Exiting Russia Plus A Future Test Regarding Stakeholder Values) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-17-2/

13. The impact of the discontinuation of sporting and cultural events will filter down to the Russian people. While they have been receiving very restricted information, the disappearance of these activities affect real lives and will be noticed and will be long lasting. (See Attachment #16: The Impactful Use of Sports and Culture Bans) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-15-16/

14. Arctic research plus the space program pull back will be detrimental to Russia. Seven countries that ring the North Pole have pulled back from the Arctic Council, the international body that seeks to build co-operation on the development of the Arctic in protest. The European Space Agency’s Mars ambitions may see a delay. It’s a joint project between ESA and Roscosmos and the invasion makes its planned launch this year very unlikely.  (See Attachment #17: Both Arctic Research and Space Programs Will Be Affected) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-15-16/

15. The media’s role, including that of social media, is crucial and weaponized and will play a role in the outcome. This war is one that is being presented to the world in real time, through not only professional media located all over Ukraine, but because everyone has a cell phone, and are daily posting in social media little bits of (horrible) reality. While they are only peephole views of what’s going on, and are subject to each person wanting (hoping) to see certain things, they will be influencial.“ The “weaponization” of social media is now in real time. (See Attachment #18: The Media’s Role, Including that of Social Media) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-17/

16. Disinformation: is being utilized by both sides, but it’s now more sophisticated. This is part of the standard toolbox of conflict. It always has been, but today it’s more powerful and effective.

17. Body bags will influence the Russian public. Realities such as these can not be  ignored, nuanced or explained. Other ways to get information to the average Russian on the street will infiltrate with the truth (the youth figuring out how to use social media channels to get a world view; sports and culture cancellations; students returning from abroad; relatives and friends abroad communicating). But dead soldiers tell a story.

18. Nuclear power plants: have become a potential and frightening risk. Never has there been a war fought amid so many nuclear reactors (15 of them at four sites). It’s not just the reactors themselves but the spent fuel rods close by; this ups the global risk.

19. Accidental escalation in the war is always possible. Accidental clashes along Ukraine’s border or a strong Putin initiated retaliation to Western sanctions could escalate the war. Accidental incidents are always possible, say with an isolated cross-border attack on military supplies destined for Ukraine. Also Putin could up the ante against Western sanctions by ordering major cyberattacks on banks in Europe and North America. If this resulted in serious damage, pressure on NATO countries to launch a counterstrike would be acute.

C) The war strategically:

1. This conflict has world-wide implications. Whether it is called a Third Word War or not, the impact is reverberating all over the world, in terms of inflation, financial disruption, energy supply, personal angst, food cost and distribution, trade and supply chains, and fear of nuclear consequences. 

2. International institutions will have their mandates tested. The European Union (EU) will serve a stronger role in the future. NATO will be strengthened. The G7 (or Group of Seven) suspended Russia indefinitely in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea. President Biden has said that Russia should be expelled from the Group of Twenty (G20). It should also be expelled from the World Trade Organization. The secretary-general of OPEC however has made it plain that Russia would not be kicked out of the OPEC+ (See Attachment #19: The Response From International Institutions) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-18/

3. NATO had better be serious about the Article 5 guarantees (and not fear escalation). If Putin stages a military incursion across a NATO border, he must be met with force. The Russians can (and do) threaten to ratchet things up, knowing that the West will respond with increased anxiety rather than military reciprocity. This fear over nuclear escalation has given Putin a psychological edge.

4. The United Nations has both risen to the challenge of Putin’s actions, and is impotent. Its Security Council is dysfunctional, as Russia has veto powers so the Council can’t condemn the war. However the General Assembly has powers and has recently passed a resolution condemning the invasion. It will also intensify efforts to rethink the global architecture it has to manage international security. Ultimately the UN should consider booting Russia out entirely. Further, there is a suggestion that the General Assembly establish an authorized force wearing blue helmets and drawn from around the world to allow civilians to move to safety and permit humanitarian aid to flow. (Again see Attachment #19: The Response From International Institutions) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-18/

5. 141 states supported a UN General Assembly resolution deploring “the aggression of the Russian Federation,” demanding that Russia “completely and unconditionally withdraw” its forces from Ukraine. Those voting in favour represented all parts of the world, including close Russian allies such as Serbia and Brazil, and powerful countries in Africa such as Kenya, Nigeria and Egypt. The five states voting against were in a small club, Russia, Syria, North Korea, Belarus and Iritrea. The abstentions were significant: India, Pakistan, South Africa and China. (See Attachment #20: Key Countries Around the World and Their Positions (Canada; US; China) and Attachment #21: Other Countries and their Involvement – this a list of 30 plus countries and where they stand on Putin’s war.) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-19-20/

6. There is legitimate fear that Putin will not stop at Ukraine. If he sees weakness in NATO and the US, and he continues to get away with his exploits and continues to rattle the nuclear threat, other countries are at risk, in particular the Baltics and perhaps Kazakhstan and Georgia – any state that Putin sees as  “proper Russian territory”.

7. Russia has a different, and concerning, protocol about the use of nuclear weapons. Russia’s different nuclear doctrine is dangerous, and potentially more so given the way the Ukraine war is proceeding. It can be divided into two components. The first is global nuclear deterrence, a continuation of the USSR’s nuclear policy throughout the Cold War. It deters potential nuclear strikes on Russia by threatening to retaliate with the state’s strategic nuclear arsenal. The second component of Russia’s nuclear posture entails “using tactical nuclear weapons to deter large scale conventional war, and is often called the “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine. It conceives of nuclear weapons as usable instruments in a conventional conflict, to be used if Russia is engaged in a conflict that it cannot win in favourable conditions conventionally or when the security of the state is endangered. (See Attachment #22: Russia’s Different, and Concerning, Protocol About the Use of Nuclear Weapons)  https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-21/

8. Putin has guessed wrong; he has underestimated the resolve of the West. No one, and particularly Putin, expected the West to respond so quickly and severely (to sanction the Russian Central Bank, to impose oil supply actions, etc. is powerful stuff). He thought, based on his estimation of Western military reluctance, that he could act with relative impunity. He is a creature of his past service in Russia’s intelligence services of using intimidation.

9. The war has aroused fury in Western countries on an unprecedented scale. Ukrainian flags are being made and displayed, millions of dollars collected and being funnelled in to support. People are finding it a very emotional experience, watching it daily on TV.  

10. Nationalism: history’s lesson has shown that brute force cannot extinguish a people’s desire to be free. Nationalism is the most powerful ideology on the planet. Ukraine’s identity will be strengthened further by the way they have fought. Even Ukraine’s Russian speakers have not felt “liberated” by the invasion. Putin’s war, aimed at reunifying what he sees as two parts of the Russian nation, is having the opposite effect. Ukraine has found a sense of national pride – the country and culture do exist and they will fight to continue to do so.

11. Neither side can “win” this war militarily. The Ukrainians will fight as insurgents, but they likely cannot militarily defeat the Russian brute force, and Putin can’t subdue a country of 44 million people. It likely will grind its way to the point described as a “hurting stalemate”. Any Russian “victory” may well be a Pyrrhic victory.

12. Serious risks to global food security and costs will occur. Russia and Ukraine, together, account for a third of global wheat exports. Ukraine is Europe’s breadbasket; it was the world’s biggest exporter of sunflower oil; it provided about a fifth of the European Union’s soft wheat, and almost a quarter of its vegetable oil… and on, and on. High food price inflation will have serious consequences for low-income net-food-importing countries. The impact on the global food chain will be uneven and costly. This could lead to catastrophic hunger in vulnerable countries. There is an opportunity for Canada to partially displace lost world supply. (See Attachment #23: Global Food Chain Impact) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-22-23/

13. Politics in Canada and the US: may be positive for the incumbents. While it is too early to tell, Putin may have bolstered support for a Canadian Liberal government that had previously been floundering. In a similar way, Putin could be putting wind in the sails of President Biden, who is showing determination and grit (while, as one editorialist said, “Trump has revealed himself to be a craven Putin apologist.”) 

14. European politics: the war will favour the incumbents. Voters seek stability at a time of fear. The phrase “European sovereignty” is not an abstract phrase any more, as EU leaders are thinking more of joint responsibility for defence, and work toward greater autonomy in energy and food. (Again see Attachment #20: Key Countries Around the World and Their Positions (Canada; US; China) and Attachment #21: Other Countries and their Involvement – it describes how a selection of countries has handled this war and their influencing factors.) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-19-20/

15. Old and troubling questions re-emerge about the role of nuclear weapons. Since no country is threatening Russia with nuclear weapons – indeed no country is threatening Russian territory at all – Putin has no business raising the nuclear stakes. Is a man isolated and out of touch (which I believe the very war on Ukraine demonstrates) at risk of making either a nuclear miscalculation or perhaps even more dangerous, a nuclear gambit? As the conflict drags on, desperation could lead Putin to cross the nuclear threshold. The chances of his accepting defeat may be lower than the chances he escalates dramatically. If Putin selects nuclear, he will have to be met with nuclear weapons, at first tactical, and then as necessary, strategic, too. 

16. There is a future risk of “sanctions fatigue” along with reluctance to moving beyond supplying “defensive” weapons. The US and NATO have got to stick to their Ukrainian support, not waver in their current moves, and in fact bear down even more aggressively. China has been telling foreign diplomats that Western unity over Russia will splinter as the war drags on. Will the world become tired and resistant to increased fuel and food supply? Will there be a reluctance to go beyond the defensive definition and supply Ukraine with bigger-ticket items (tanks, planes, etc.)? The narrative, that the Europeans are footing the bill (energy, defence costs, refugee hosting) while the US benefits, may resonate with some.

17. War crimes: 39 governments have asked the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an investigation into possible war crimes and crimes against humanity. Experts suggest that the complicated process has been made easier, given Putin regularly incriminates himself. Plus the evidence is clear. The prospect of facing legal charges also might possibly deter some of Putin’s lieutenants from following orders to commit further war crimes. (See Attachment #24: The Question of War Crimes) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-22-23/

D) The future, short to medium term: 

1. This is a proxy war; care has to be taken that the West doesn’t get arrogant. As the US and NATO alliance are supplying thousands of weapon systems (especially Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger man-portable surface-to-air missiles) and likely sharing intelligence, it is obvious that Putin is pitted against these as much as Ukrainian forces. The West has entered a proxy war and may be tempted to seek overly ambitious objectives, and in particular regime change (at least not publicly). Having said that…

2. The Zelenskyy government cannot be allowed to fall; this should be the West’s red line. If it becomes likely that Putin will wipe out Ukraine as a sovereign state, then the West, with warning, must respond with adequate force. 

3. An off-ramp must be engineered for Putin. Returning to the negotiating table will be difficult. Talks have been held between Russia and Ukraine since the invasion but only with an agreement to talk again, and there has always been the fear that talks equal delay, that allows Putin scrambling time for his war machine. The shape of a potential settlement remains elusive. Putin has crossed a line, both humanitarian and of international law, that will be almost impossible to forgive or forget. The key point remains that Putin literally doesn’t recognize the right of Ukraine to exist. Where do you go as a negotiator with that as a reality? However, Russia must eventually be brought back into the community of nations. The need to stop the war should precede how one deals with him in the future. The danger is that the West does things that it considers justified but Putin sees as contributing to Russia’s destruction.

4. A reasonable outcome must be found for Ukraine and that must include reparations. “Peace” talks continue, now in Istanbul (late March). Zelenskyy has said his country is prepared to declare its neutrality (as Moscow has demanded), and is open to compromise on the fate of the Donbas. He has also declared that “Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are beyond doubt.” I feel also that some sort of reparations will have to be part of any final agreement, although Zelenskyy said Russia should “stop bombarding people first, and start negotiating afterwards.” It would be just to use the $500-million of Russian Central Bank foreign currency reserve assets that the G7 countries have frozen as reparation money.

5. Making Ukraine a neutralized state is one solution that gives Putin and Russia a way out. This was a suggestion made by John Redekop, a professor at Wilfred Laurier, before the war commenced. As he said, making Ukraine a neutralized state “is not the same as a state remaining neutral in a war.” It is a country whose “territorial sovereignty and borders are guaranteed by a treaty drawn up by the regional major powers. The neutralized  country, in turn, binds itself not to take up arms except for self-defence and agrees not to enter into any defence treaty or alliance.” The arrangement limits military freedom, but as compensation it no longer need fear military attack. It’s beneficial when a smaller state becomes a neutralized buffer state. (Switzerland has been one since 1815.) It’s an option that despite the war, can still be exercised. For Russia, the advantages are that Ukraine would not join NATO, and Russia would no longer fear the building of missile sites near its border. For Ukraine, it would no longer need military might.

6. The EU must grant membership to Ukraine, but not NATO. President Zelenskyy has to have something to show his people that their sacrifice has not been in vain. He may have to concede his country’s neutral status (if only for a a specified period). Only Ukrainians can make this call, but the offer has to be there from European leaders. Zelenskyy has already dismissed the idea of NATO membership.

7. China could play a role in the outcome, but will walk the line between exploiting Russia’s humiliation and maintaining Western business ties. Beijing will be only too happy to facilitate the dependence of its “strategic partner” on Chinese economic support, under the guise of helping it weather the Western sanctions. However, despite tensions, China continues to have strong ties with America and Europe that it cannot afford to sever. The West and China can thrive if they choose to find where they agree. Where they don’t, they must engage to work it out. The outcome will put a new burden on the system of American alliances that partially encircles them. (See my piece on China in Attachment #20: Key Countries Around the World and Their Positions (Canada; US; China) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-19-20/

8. The West must commit now to a Marshall Plan to rebuild Ukraine’s economy. Nothing will boost their confidence like the knowledge that we believe in their victory and intend to help a people willing to fight so resolutely for its freedom with a massive reconstruction plan. Ukraine is not a backward country. It is the second-largest country by area in Europe after Russia. It has tremendous resources and the world needs those resources back on line. (See Attachment #25: Ukraine, A Profile of How the Nation Ranks in Terms of Resources) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-25/

9. NATO will be strengthened, ironically for Putin, by his actions. Even the traditionally neutral Finns and Swedes feel they would be better off joining NATO. NATO will continue to pronounce solidarity, particularly emphasizing its Article 5 (that an attack on one member is an attack on them all). However, giving Russia breathing space, as would be expected of any other major power, needs to be part of an “off ramp” so the concept of placing an armed NATO member all along Russia’s borders has to be dealt with. 

10. A rethink of world energy security will take place. Putin’s war machine is essentially being subsidized by its foes – and future victims. Thus it has been determined that energy sanctions had to be significant; they must drain the Russian treasury. Reducing/ending long-term reliance on Russian oil and gas imports will occur. (The recent EU plan envisages independence from Russia by 2030, still a long time away.) New liquified natural gas facilities will be developed in Europe. Nuclear will be back in favour, as it should (Germany’s nuclear rejection was ill-advised). This will result in increased supply confidence and a reduction in income to Russia. One consequence will be increased energy costs in the short and near term for the rest of the world. 

11. Energy conservation efforts may benefit. There is a potential positive outcome as a variety of factors reflect the possibility of accelerating the transition to clean energy – a serious doubling down on renewables. It certainly will in Europe.

12. Emerging from this war is a future test of emphasizing stakeholder values for business with respect to the countries in which they operate. Corporations (not all; there are some where the word “profit” is their only moral guide) will have a check list of their corporate values before investing in a country. For example, does the rule of law exist, what’s the record of human rights, etc? Further, the idea of embedding “purpose” into a company’s operations is critical and implies balancing the interests of a business’s stakeholders. In the case of Russia, trust has been shattered, and for some, it may never come back. (See also Attachment #15: Corporate Response: Exiting Russia Plus A Future Test Regarding Stakeholder Values) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachment-17-2/

13. Restricted trade with Russia will outlast the war. Restrictions will continue for perhaps years or decades, as it will be very difficult to restore trust and economic ties and bring investments back into Russia. 

14. Pressures on globalization and free trade are mounting; this presents a trade vs restrictions dilemma that free societies have to navigate. There will be temptations for the West to pivot towards a more limited kind of trade with military allies, or even to outright self-reliance. Russia’s invasion has shown the West the perils of trading with adversaries. There are concerns, both moral (Putin’s immoral war is financed by his energy sales) and security (such trade dependency makes open societies vulnerable, and makes Russia, and other autocracies stronger). (See Attachment #26: Pressures on Globalization and Free Trade Are Mounting) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-25-26/

15. Energy supply may benefit Canada, but could have been a lot better if our country was valued as a safe supply. There are some possibilities for increasing Canadian crude to the international market, probably amounting to an extra 200,000 barrels per day of oil to the US, as well as natural gas equivalent to 100,000 barrels per day. This will free up oil and gas supplies in the US and elsewhere so that those countries can in turn reroute fuel to the EU. It’s obvious that Canada is and will be a secure, stable and trusted partner in the transition to clean energy. The obvious arguments should re-emerge – that Canadian crude for the US surely is more attractive than that from unstable or dangerous countries, and from across oceans no less. There are, however, hard limits on our pipeline network, as well within Quebec, whose intransigence on new crude supply developments, is flawed public policy. There might also be pressures to revive the Keystone XL crude pipeline. (See the section on Canada in Attachment #20: Key Countries Around the World and Their Positions (Canada; US; China) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-19-20/

16. Tracking and gaining advance warning of Russian “hybrid” warfare on the West needs to be dealt with. Russia has been waging this kind of warfare for years. Their objectives are to divide and weaken NATO; to subvert pro-Western governments; to create pretexts for war; to annex territory; and to ensure access to European markets on its own terms. Hybrid means using multiple instruments of power and influence, with an emphasis on nonmilitary tools, to pursue its national interests outside its borders. This is more important than ever, but it requires close intelligence sharing relationships between key allies (US, EU, and others). (See Attachment #27: Russian Hybrid Warfare Needs to be Dealt With – Read the testimony presented before the US House Armed Services Committee; it opens ones eyes to their Russia’s strategies and the consequences.) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-25-26/

E) The future, longer term:

1. Putin: he must go; he has over-reached. After all that I’ve read, listened to and seen I conclude that this must be the only long view solution. Putin’s style and brand is so toxic that it can’t be tolerated in the world community. He will be a persistent threat to European and global stability for many years. How he will go is speculative: internal regime change, whether done with or without external support; charge him with war crimes (which seems likely); certainly killing him is part of a list of options. Stalinism didn’t die until Stalin did. The same was true of Maoism. It must be so for Putinism. 

2. A strong democratic Ukraine, with secure borders, would thwart Russian expansionism. Perhaps this would lead to Russia solving its problems (minus Putin, who has an unrealistic agenda) at home rather than attack other countries.

3. The conflict magnifies the battle between democracies and authoritarian states. Contemporary geopolitics focuses on China/US, but Russia’s invasion brings in focus the eastern European system, and all those who support it. Who will be on the “right side of history” in this struggle? Further, liberal democracies will be pitted against large autocracies, with the latter getting bigger, richer and more technologically sophisticated. There will be a new kind of Cold War, which looks like a long confrontation with Russia, with the potential of China serving as its economic lifeline. 

4. There is a need to re-examine democracy, particularly as it is being practiced in the US, with Russia’s attack on Ukraine as a magnifying glass. Democracies are being harmed from within by illiberal forces, including unscrupulous politicians willing to corrupt and shatter the very institutions that brought them to power. With the prime example that of the US which has fallen below its traditional peers on key democratic indicators. When you have the findings of the January 6 committee reveal that the pro-Putin wing of the Republican Party appears to have been willing to overturn the US liberal democracy so long as it could get what it wanted, you know there is something seriously wrong with your country. (See Attachment #28: The Need to Re-examine Democracy.) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-27-28/

5. The cost of democracy has gone up. Western democratic powers will become more serious about their defence policies. Increases in military and communications expenditures will result. Increased NATO funding will occur. The free world, and especially America, needs to understand that this will have costs – in the price of gasoline at the pump; in budgets that support larger military expenditures; in the receiving of refugees.

6. Russia will suffer serious, permanent long term consequences from embarking upon this war. These include: country reputation, crude and natural gas supply sourcing, corporate investment, tourism, international finance. It is a classic example of cutting off your nose to spite your face. 

7. Russia’s reputation is, and will remain, in taters. Russia will be a global pariah for decades. Putin is perceived as inflicting the horrors of war on a brotherly nation. There is visceral outrage against Russia around much of the world that will remain permanently.

8. Russian propaganda: there is a need to end Russian political corruption, disinformation, propaganda within the countries of the free world. The free world needs to make a concerted, organized effort to strip out, expel and/or prosecute Russian intelligence officers and their assets; organized crime and corrupt business/political interests; and state-sponsored, ‘gray zone’ and social media assets sponsored or directed by Russia. It’s gone on far too long.

9. Canada needs to develop an actionable plan to defend our North. We need to invest in a military and naval presence. Putin has claimed the resources under the Arctic (and China has a ridiculous description of itself as a “near-Arctic” state!) (Again see the section on Canada in Attachment #20: Key Countries Around the World and Their Positions (Canada; US; China) https://powellponderings.com/putins-war-attachments-19-20/

10. Liberal governments, and particularly the US, cannot afford to disengage from the world. A retreat by the West (as did the US under Trump) to cold-war spheres of influence or self-reliance would be a mistake. Supply chains, for example, get stronger through diversification, not concentration. Dictators will still be able to initiate conflicts that threaten US allies and America’s own prosperity and security, however…

11. Globalization movement: will be constrained in the future. Global trade has been falling over the last 15 years (effects of 2007-09 financial crisis; Brexit; Trump; the pandemic) but the war will accelerate it. The Russia war has put in focus the question whether less integration, rather than more, protects countries from economic pain, as well as securing one’s own supply. 

12. A recalibration of the international order will take place. Western powers are going to have to think about how they can work together along with their coordinating bodies.

13. The price of past appeasement has been too steep. Even before the invasion of Ukraine the West was opening its eyes to reality. Putin had been seen as a solution to some of the world’s most intractable problems: the scourge of Islamic terror; the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea; the crisis in Syria, but he will no longer be appeased to be useful.

14. The future of nuclear weapons: one outcome of this war could (should) be to push the world to finally purge nuclear weapons of all sorts. There’s a new sense of urgency around nuclear weapons and the undemocratic decision-making around their use. It could be time for serious discussions regarding why the world needs these weapons, and why we are kept in the dark about how they might be used.

Conclusion

I wasn’t sure how to end my description and analysis of this tragic period in human history. I knew I wanted to emphasize Putin, the prime cause of this tragic event, and why I titled it “Putin’s War”. The answer I found in reading “On Consolation”, Michael Ignatieff’s  book on “finding solace in dark times”. He writes about a legendary Russian poet, Anna Akhmatova, who wrote among many things, about the difficulties of living and writing in the shadow of Stalinism. 

Akhmatova had a poignant encounter as she waited in front of the Kresty prison in Leningrad in 1938. In the long line of women waiting day after day for news of their incarcerated men, a woman recognized Anna and whispered “Can you describe this?” She said “I can” and then wrote a poem that puts everyone who reads it under an obligation never to forget:

“Now I will never manage to entangle

Who is an animal and who is a human being

Nor how long I’ll wait till the death sentence

Is carried out.”

Putin has become the new Stalin in this saga. There can be no real answer to Ukraine’s tragedy until the message in that poem is fulfilled.