Attachment #26: Pressures on Globalization and Free Trade Are Mounting
Pressures on globalization and free trade are mounting; this presents a trade vs restrictions dilemma that free societies have to navigate. There will be temptations for the West to pivot towards a more limited kind of trade with military allies, or even to outright self-reliance. Trump, and now Biden has been promising more “American first” strategies. The Economist has asked “Is it prudent for open societies to conduct normal economic relations with autocratic ones, such as Russia and China, that abuse human rights, endanger security and grow more threatening the richer they get?” They answer “In principle, democracies should seek to maximize trade without compromising national security. In practice, that is a hard line to draw.”
Russia’s invasion has shown the West the perils of trading with adversaries. There are concerns, both moral (Putin’s immoral war is financed by his energy and other resource sales), and security (such trade dependency makes open societies vulnerable, and makes Russia, and other autocracies stronger). In war, severing economic relations makes sense. In peace the goal should be to limit exports of only the most sensitive technologies to illiberal regimes. Supply chains get stronger through diversification, not concentration. When autocracies have the power to intimidate, the aim should not be national self-sufficiency, but rather to require firms to diversify their suppliers, in turn stimulating investment in new sources of supply.
Attachment #27: Russian Hybrid Warfare Needs to be Dealt With
Russia has been waging what is being described as “hybrid” warfare on the West. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee of the US House of Representatives in 2017, suggests that their objectives are to divide and weaken NATO; to subvert pro-Western governments; to create pretexts for war; to annex territory; and to ensure access to European markets on its own terms. Hybrid means using multiple instruments of power and influence, with an emphasis on nonmilitary tools, to pursue its national interests outside its borders.
It has three main characteristics. First, It economizes the use of force. Recognizing Russia would stand little chance of winning a protracted conventional conflict with NATO, Moscow seeks instead to pursue its interests without overt use of military power if possible (ironic now, considering the invasion of Ukraine). Russia may still use its conventional and even nuclear threats as part of a hybrid strategy, but in general it prefers to minimize the actual employment of traditional military force. The use of cyber tools is an excellent example of one way in which Russia economizes on the use of force.
Secondly, it is persistent. Hybrid war breaks down the traditional binary delineation between war and peace. The reality of hybrid war is ever-changing intensity of conflict. Hybrid war strategies are always underway, although at certain moments they may become more acute and intense or cross over into conventional combat operations.
Thirdly, it is population-centric. Russian military experts have watched as the US and its allies fought in the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere over the course of the last quarter- century. They seized upon the importance of an approach that seeks to influence the population of target countries through information operations, proxy groups, and other influence operations. Russia uses hybrid warfare to work within existing political and social frameworks to further Russian objectives.
The hybrid warfare toolkit includes:
* Information operations. Russia has become notably more effective in its use of strategic communications to shape political narratives in many countries. Outlets such as Russia Today and Sputnik News are among the most well known vectors for this strategy, but Russia also uses targeted television programming; funds European think tanks to promote its views; and employs large numbers of Internet trolls, bots, and fake news farms.
* Cyber. The Kremlin now has access to a growing cadre of cyber warriors that allows it to hack into Western information systems to collect valuable information. The information is then used to influence elections and other political outcomes outside Russia’s borders
* Proxies. Russia also uses a range of proxies to further its interests. Proxies are often groups that have broad sympathy with Russia’s objectives.
* Economic influence. Russia uses both direct and indirect economic influence to affect European politics. Moscow used energy as a tool of foreign policy when it shut off the natural gas supplies to Ukraine in the dead of the winter in 2006 and 2009 in an overt effort to coerce Ukraine into agreement on the price of its gas. The indirect influence Moscow has built in Europe, however, may be even more important. Taking advantage of the vast network of natural gas pipelines built in Soviet times, the Russian state-owned gas giant Gazprom and its subsidiaries wield influence over the politics and economics of many European countries
* Clandestine measures. Russia also has the ability to use traditional espionage as part of its hybrid methods, bribing, extorting, and otherwise attempting to influence vulnerable political figures to further its interests. As part of its broader military modernization program, Russia has invested in strengthening its special operations forces. These forces have a range of roles, but one of their most dramatic has been in infiltrating other countries and directing hybrid warfare efforts there
* Political influence. Russian leaders also use traditional diplomacy to support their preferred political parties and candidates, offering high-level visits in Moscow and otherwise attempting to champion their claims, while deriding the positions of political leaders more critical of Moscow
This report was presented March 22, 2017, and should be read by anyone trying to understand Russian tactics, and their objectives. The report can be read here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf