Attachment #22: Russia’s Different, and Concerning, Protocol About the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Russia has a different protocol about the use of nuclear weapons. Putin has ordered Russia’s nuclear forces to be on high alert (“special combat status” was his phrase). What are his intentions with this order, and would he really press the red button? Putin has signalled grave consequences if anyone gets in his way. High readiness makes it easier to use them. He’s trying to deter the west from getting involved. An important point is that the west has not responded in kind. Because the west (France, Britain and America being the three NATO countries with nuclear weapons) has nuclear subs everywhere patrolling the sea, and they can’t be taken out; they’re always ready.
Putin’s approach seems to show a sense of weakness, that he is fearful; he wants to keep the west out of the conflict. It’s likely that the concept of nuclear assured destruction, where the likely result of both sides suffering incredible consequences creating a degree of stability, will prevail. But it only needs one mistake, or one unstable mind.
Russia’s different nuclear doctrine is dangerous, and potentially more so given the way the Ukraine war is proceeding. It can be divided into two components. The first is global nuclear deterrence, a continuation of the USSR’s nuclear policy throughout the Cold War. It deters potential nuclear strikes on Russia by threatening to retaliate with the state’s strategic nuclear arsenal.
According to the NATO Association of Canada, the second component of Russia’s nuclear posture entails “using tactical nuclear weapons to deter large scale conventional war, and is often called the “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine. It conceives of nuclear weapons as usable instruments in a conventional conflict, to be used if Russia is engaged in a conflict that it cannot win in favourable conditions conventionally or when the security of the state is endangered.
The “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine entails Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional battlefield to arrive at a political settlement, without escalating in a full-fledged nuclear war or large scale regional war. It presumes that when faced with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, an adversary unwilling to escalate would cease all hostilities and attempt to compromise with Moscow. However, this strategy is a double-edged sword: if ready and willing to escalate, the adversary could trigger a large scale nuclear retaliation or counter-offensive, at Russia’s detriment.
The spectre of nuclear involvement is also analyzed in a disturbing piece in New Eastern Ukrainian magazine whose authors posit that nuclear blackmail is the third phase of Putin’s war. They describe Phase One being the current ground-based blitzkrieg that aimed to capture major cities in days, overthrow the government and install a puppet regime. Its failure thus far is why Phase Two is the current “scorched earth” strategy of indiscriminate bombing aimed at civilians and infrastructure. Putin said that he will not stop the war until Ukraine capitulates. But what if Ukraine will not capitulate? Russia’s scorched earth tactic only motivates the population further to do more to defend Ukraine to the last drop of blood.
The article suggests that inevitably, Putin will begin the third phase of the war: “the nuclear blackmail of Europe. Russian state media has been filled with fake stories concerning how Ukraine supposedly maintained its nuclear capability despite having formally given up all weapons in the 1990s. These stories are contrary to the assessments of the International Atomic Energy Agency, according to which Ukraine has no military nuclear capacity and no plans to develop it. However, these facts are irrelevant as the Russian public is clearly being prepared for nuclear escalation in Ukraine. A story of the Russian ‘discovery’ of a supposed Ukrainian nuclear weapons programme could be used as justification (for Putin’s domestic audience) for a limited tactical nuclear strike on a Ukrainian city.”
Russia’s nuclear stockpile consists of more than 4,000 weapons, of which nearly 1,600 are deployed, or ready to go. Putin has used banned weapons such as chemical agents, and the the general assessment is that he would not be inhibited in the deployment of them or a nuclear initiative because the outcome would be unusual or cruel. He has the sole launch authority, as does the President of the US. (Biden may consult advisors, but he does not have to.)
A disturbing perspective on Putin’s attitude towards the use of nuclear weapons comes from Nina Khrushcheva, the great-granddaughter of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. She suspects that there will be no backing down, no matter how great the losses on the battlefield. Putin’s attitude in her estimation, is that “we will go as far as we need to go to show you in the West that you don’t treat us like dirt.” Going as far as needed, she suspects, could well include the nuclear option. Putin often justifies his actions by citing American conduct. He could justify using lower-grade nuclear weapons, she said, by pointing to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Will an outcome of this war push the world to purge nuclear weapons of all sorts? Elizabeth Renzetti said in the Globe & Mail, “The best way to deal with nuclear anxiety would be to have no nukes to be anxious about.” Recently the unthinkable has been suggested by Shinzo Abe, the former prime minister of a country once devastated by nuclear bombs, that Japan should be open to nuclear sharing. That is, playing host to US weapons on Japanese territory. There was strong push back.
It’s time for serious discussions regarding why the world needs these weapons, and why we are kept in the dark about how they might be used. There’s a new sense of urgency around nuclear weapons and the undemocratic decision-making around their use. Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security Program at Chatham House, said recently: “It’s a silver lining to the current situation.”