Attachment #23: Global Food Chain Impact
The impact on the global food chain will be uneven and costly. Agricultural commodities are traded on world markets, so what happens in the war affects us. Everything is interconnected. Agri-food companies will have problems accessing key ingredients (with both Ukranian and Russian products limited as well as commercial vessel disruptions). Russia and Ukraine, together, account for a third of global wheat exports. Ukraine is Europe’s breadbasket; it is the ninth-largest wheat producer (slightly less than Canada). It is the fifth-largest producer of corn. Before the war, Ukraine was the world’s biggest exporter of sunflower oil (along with Russia commanding 80% of the world’s supply). It provided about a fifth of the European Union’s soft wheat, and almost a quarter of its vegetable oil.
90% of Ukranian grain exports are transported by sea. The invasion has led to a ban on commercial vessels in the Sea of Azov (the main connection to the Black Sea) where Ukranian ports are located. Rising oil prices will impact transportation fees. The fertilizer market has been affected (and less fertilizer would mean lower crop yield, plus natural gas is a key input to making fertilizer). The region is a significant exporter of nitrogen, potassium and phosphorus fertilizers. Overnight the invasion increased fertilizer prices globally by more than $2,000 a tonne.
So two obvious outcomes: prices will rise considerably (wheat and corn futures are already nearing record levels). As well, disruption in supply is and will occur. This will impact millions of people around the developing world: Ethiopia, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, Bangladesh. Some are in serious trouble. “In Yemen alone, five million people are literally a step away from famine” said the chief economist at the UN World Food Program. The Eurasia Group predicts “a spike in starvation around the world.”
Food inflation will affect the world unevenly. The Economist predicts North Americans spend on average 5% of their incomes on food; next year that could rise to 8%. But in Latin America it’s shooting toward 20%, and in South Asia toward 30%.
Attachment #24: The Question of War Crimes
The question of war crimes has emerged very early in this conflict and will play out in court. It appears certain that Putin and a selection of his generals will be indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for possible war crimes, perhaps in a few months, which is quick for the process. Experts suggest that the complicated process has been made easier, given Putin regularly incriminates himself. Plus the evidence is clear: Russia has been bombarding some cities with shells, rockets (and apparently cluster munitions – which release small bomblets over a wide area, inflicting heavy civilian casualties).
The attacks on civilians are not just mistakes. Human Rights Watch said it documented a cluster bomb attack outside a hospital. Russia’s recent strikes in Kharkiv and other cities show little sign of any effort to identify enemy forces at all. “It’s hard to square the use of cluster munitions in a city, where there are no military targets in that area,” says Mr Cranny-Evans, “with anything other than trying to inflict terror.”
The ICC prosecutor said he planned to open an investigation and that the ICC intends to speed up the process. Canada announced its intention to petition the ICC; 38 other ICC member states have also referred this matter. (As Ukraine is not a party to the Rome Statute that governs the court, it “cannot itself refer the situation”.) Canada as a signatory to the treaty – and founding member of the ICC. Interestingly the US is not a member of the ICC and does not recognize its authority, but would support the intention. Neither is Russia a member.
It is one thing to find that Russia is in breach of these international laws, quite another to bring any Russian, let alone its head of state, to the world court. ICC rules say that both parties to a dispute – the aggressor as well as victim – must accept the court’s jurisdiction. Ukraine does. In 2000 Russia signed the Rome statute that set up the ICC, but it withdrew its signature in 2016 after the court classified its annexation of Crimea as an occupation. That does not rule out the prosecutor’s bringing a case or issuing arrest warrants. But it would require the Russian government to hand over indicted individuals (which the Putin regime is unlikely to do) or would require the UN Security Council to refer Russia to the court. Russia has a veto there so long as it retains its position as one of the council’s permanent five members. The prospect of facing legal charges might possibly deter some of Putin’s lieutenants from following orders to commit further war crimes.