I wrote the original blog on March 31, just after a month of fighting. It is now six months since Putin’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine (although for Ukraine the war really started with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its first attempt to take over Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region). Looking over what I wrote, I would change little. But I would add some things.
1) Current Russian objectives:
* They are to consolidate eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, an industrial heartland for Ukraine, full of coal mines and factories. This represents almost 20% of Ukraine. (Before the war, Russia controlled 7%, including the Crimea Peninsula and parts of the Donbas.)
* The city of Severodonetsk lies at the eastern edge of that pocket and is the gateway to the north-east of Donetsk province, the other part of Donbas. If Russia takes it and Lysychansk, it would in effect control all of Luhansk. And if Slovyansk and Kramatorsk were eventually to fall, Russia would then control almost all of the biggest towns and cities in Donetsk province too. That, in turn, would allow it to claim that it had gone some way to meeting its stated war aim of “liberating” Donbas.
* Kherson is the only regional capital city that Russia has captured. Russia is holding, on 9/11, a phoney referendum vote (in Kherson and other occupied regions) to approve annexation by Russia. They are offering $165 to vote in favour!. People are being jailed or shot there for protesting, speaking Ukranian, or refusing to use the Russian Ruble (which has been introduced as the second official currency in both the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions). But resistance is mounting; Russian soldiers are staying off the streets following some assassinations and Kherson’s Russian-backed mayor was poisoned by his chef.
* Fighting continues around Europe’s largest nuclear plant in Zaporizhzhia. It is controlled by 500 Russian soldiers and shelling around it has sparked global alarm. The UN has demanded that experts from the Atomic Energy Agency occupy the facility and that the region around it be declared a Demilitarized Zone. Putin has refused. It’s his nuclear blackmail card as he can shut it down for the winter, removing 25% of all power generated in Ukraine.
* It is likely Putin will attempt to take Odessa and other Black Sea ports, with the goal of leaving Ukraine an economically inviolable, landlocked country.
2) The status on the ground (update on B1and B3 of original blog):
* On April 14, Ukrainian missiles sank the Moskva, a guided-missile cruiser which was the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. This was a devastating and symbolic loss and a blow to Russian prestige plus the fact that its removal from combat reduces Russian firepower in the Black Sea.
* Between 1,000 and 1,700 last-ditch fighters, who held out inside Mariupol’s pulverized steel plant, surrendered May 19. This resistance drained Russia of weapons and personnel and prevented it from getting an unbroken land bridge to the Crimean Peninsula which Russia seized from Ukraine in 2014.
* Russia made a tactical error in adopting the brutal tactics it had used in Chechnya and Syria: targeting civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and residential buildings. This has only strengthened Ukranian resolve. They were counterproductive in another way – they convinced the US and other Western countries that it was pointless to broker a compromise settlement with Putin. Instead, it encouraged the supply and use of the big weapons, both offensive and defensive.. (The revelations of possible war crimes in places such as Bucha didn’t help the Russian cause either.) While Russia has made some small gains in the east and south of Ukraine, these weapons have inhibited a larger advance.
* There is a continued and increased need by Ukraine for sophisticated western-supplied weaponry. Germany pledged June 1 to equip Ukraine with up-to-date anti-aircraft missiles and radar systems. The US continue to send Ukraine advanced rocket systems as part of a huge military-equipment package; they also promised to donate an air-defence system and a tracking radar to the Ukrainian army.
* Putin continues to threaten escalation if the West delivers any longer-range rocket systems; Putin’s cryptic threat was that that would prompt Moscow to hit “objects that we haven’t yet struck.” However escalation is inexorably occuring. Besides destruction of the Moskva, on Aug. 9 at least eight warplanes have been destroyed at the Saki airbase in Russian-occupied Crimea. Over time the US has gradually being supplying more and more HIMARS multiple-launch rocket systems; the Ukrainians continue to pretend that it wasn’t the American weapons that are doing the damage. (The important question of escalation is considered in Point 17.)
* In June, President Zelensky said more than 30,000 Russian servicemen had died which is “more than the Soviet Union lost in 10 years of the war in Afghanistan”. (In another recent report it has been estimated that 15,000 Russians have been killed and 45,000 wounded. This, by the way, is an example of the dilemma one has – how much of the information one depends upon is accurate.) By contrast, outgunned and outmanned Ukraine is losing between 60 and 100 soldiers a day, and perhaps up to 200. President Vladimir Putin just signed a decree to increase Russia’s armed forces by 137,000 combat personnel to 1.15 million. It comes into effect on January 1st. Perhaps; the war will now depend, in part, on which army can replenish faster.
* As Russians retreat from some of the cities they previously occupied (Bucha being one example), horror stories have emerged that indicate murder, torture and sexual assault as the Russian soldiers took over houses. Bodies were being collected off the streets, as the Russians wouldn’t bury all those killed. In other cases, there are mass graves.
* As many of the ports Ukraine uses to export their wheat, corn and sunflower oil were being attacked and mined, countries that desperately needed these products are suffering. Russia is essentially weaponizing hunger among the poor of the world. The real crisis will begin to emerge as the winter wheat (it also has a higher protein content that spring wheat), which is sown in the fall, is ready for harvest in summer or early fall. Getting that to market is critical, even considering the Turkey-brokered agreement to allow some of these grains shipments to proceed without being attacked.
* A friend of mine noted another critical Ukrainian product that is being affected: the export of queen bees. Around 1.5% of Ukraine’s population is engaged in various forms of beekeeping. With flowers and food crops depending on pollination, a threat to bees is a threat to global food security and nutrition; it is serious if that is interrupted by the war.
* The Russian economy: many products manufactured in Russia rely on imported components. Because of Western export restrictions, Russian companies will be forced to shift their supply chains or start making their own components. For example Russian airlines, besides being banned from flying over much of Europe and North America, are running out of important parts to keep them safely flying.
* As early as late March a Russian industry trade group estimated that between 50,000 and 70,000 tech workers had left the country and that an additional 70,000 to 100,000 would soon follow; This exit will fundamentally change the Russian tech industry. They are going to Armenia, as well as Georgia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and other countries that accept Russian citizens without visas. Eventually Russia has to diversify its economy away from oil and gas, and tech was a natural way of doing this – so this brain drain will be serious.
* A symbol of Russia’s increasing isolation was the announcement mid-May by McDonald’s Corp that they are selling their business in Russia.They were the first American fast food restaurant to open in the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago and grew to 850 outlets and employed 62,000 people. They are removing the golden arches and the symbols and signs with the company name (update on B12 of original blog)
* The number of Ukrainians who have fled for Europe now exceeds 8 million; another 8 million are displaced inside the country. The refugee flow, however, in recent weeks is now reversing.
* In launching his invasion, Putin has underestimated Ukraine, assuming it to be weak, while having excessive confidence in what his own forces could achieve. According to a July/August article in Foreign Affairs, Russia’s command structure and philosophy is more hierarchical. A lot has to do with the autocratic systems in Russia, where officers and officials must think twice before challenging superiors. This goes all the way to the top where the senior command, and Putin himself, are likely making decisions based on their own ill-informed assumptions and are unlikely to be challenged. Dictators “tend to surround themselves with like-minded advisors and to prize loyalty above competence in their senior military commanders.”
* Are there signs the Russian regime is starting to unravel? The recent murder of ultra-nationalist Darya Dugina, age 29, in Moscow could reflect growing divisions within Russia over the war. She was the daughter of philosopher Alexander Dugin – a man often referred to as “Putin’s brain” because of his reported influence over Putin. Dugin in the past has presented the war as a far wider spiritual battle. After the annexation of Crimea, he said that “Ukraine has to be…vanquished from Earth and rebuilt from scratch.” His rantings talk a lot about a clash of civilizations, between what he defines as globalist (read, in the lingo of the far-right Russian circles “the US, NATO or the ‘West’”) and Eurasian (read “Russia”).
* As the Globe & Mail observed in their August 23 editorial, it is a “delusion that the war’s continuation is Ukraine’s fault. If only Ukraine would be reasonable, sit down at the negotiating table and sign away some territory to Russia, it would all be over tomorrow.” As they note, the trouble with this view is that it ignores Putin’s invasion “started with a demand for total surrender. He insisted that Ukraine is not a real country and as such he declared that he had every right to change its government and reabsorb it into the Russian sphere of influence, or annex its territory.”
3) Status of financial blocks (update on B10 of original blog):
* On May 25, the US did not renew the license that allowed Russia to keep paying its debt holders through US banks, closing the last avenue for Russia to pay its billions in debt back to international investors, making a default on its debts for the first time since the 1917 Revolution. Rating agencies have placed Russia’s debt deep into junk territory.
4) Status of oil and gas embargoes (important update on B11 of original blog):
* EU’s efforts to shut Russian energy out of its markets is proving difficult. They are losing sales but other countries (India, China, etc.) are eager buyers of cheap Russian energy and thus Putin is able to pay for his war for some time. Russian oil exports are expected to fall about 20% this year but higher prices (the Brent crude variety is up 64% over the past year) are keeping its export revenues largely intact. One important logistical point about oil is that it is very flexible regarding delivery because of the fact that it is delivered by ship (two-thirds of the oil and refined products consumed around the world are delivered by ships), Ships can go anywhere, anytime; pipelines cannot be moved.
* One tactic now being employed by the EU is to ban insurers from covering ships that carry Russian oil; this will shut Russia out of the Lloyds of London insurance market, which forms the core of the global marine insurance industry. (Without liability insurance, many ports would prevent oil-laden Russian ships from delivering product.)
* Another tactic being debated within the EU is to ban natural gas exports from Russia (the EU imports 40% of its gas from Russia). Russia cannot sell say to China as the gas pipelines that deliver to Europe are not connected to eastern pipelines.
* India has emerged as a increasing purchaser of Russian oil, as the benchmark Urals crude is being offered at a discount of about US$30 a barrel to international prices
There is a sound argument (made by Eric Reguly in the April 23 Globe & Mail) that the best way to punish Putin would be to actually take all the gas he has on offer under the somewhat flexible long-term contracts. Doing so would accomplish two things. It would push the price down, perhaps a lot, depriving Russia of energy revenue; and it would buy Europe time to build LNG terminals, ramp up its renewable-energy output and build new pipelines, or expand existing lines, from North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, where big reserves have been found. At that point – the effort would take several years – Europe could stop importing Russian gas.
* The recent more than 70% price increase in crude (resulting in gasoline at the pump going up about 70 cents per litre vs a year ago) does not have a simple cause: motorists start driving more in the late spring so demand is up; investors are reluctant to plunge money into what could become stranded refinery assets (with oil demand forecast to plunge in the next couple of decades); there is environmental pressure on what’s seen as dirty refining and regulations that are more and more favouring greener fuels resulting in declining refining capacity; China has cut export of refined products to help cut local pollution and meet climate targets; and finally, the war in Ukraine has forced a refined products reduction from Russia (although crude exports are actually up).
* A nuclear power source revival (though fraught with difficulties) is under way. The problem is that the lead time is so long to bring new reactors on stream, and the energy crunch is now. Currently a quarter of all electricity for the EU comes from nuclear power produced in a dozen countries from an aging fleet that was mostly built in the 1980s. France, with 56 reactors, produces more than half the total. While Germany may persist in its (ill advised, but driven by politics – the anti-nuke Greens are part of he governing coalition) plan to close its last three nuclear stations in December (although this decision is now under serious review). Other counties are moving forward. They include Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and a number of countries in eastern Europe. (See D10 in original blog)
5) Worldwide support for Ukraine is mixed
* Not all countries in the world are speaking out against Russia’s war. Some are quite the opposite. Pakistan signed a trade deal with Russia just days after the UN voted on March 2nd to deplore the invasion (in which 40 countries opposed or abstained). Turkey clings to the sidelines, and resisted the move to bring Sweden and Finland into NATO. (Since resolved – maybe.) India has continued to buy crude from Russia and will not ally with the US or Britain. Sri Lanka is in the middle of an economic crisis and is contemplating buying Russia’s enticingly discounted crude. And of course, there is China.
* Part of the problem is that sanctions are driving up fuel and food costs. Another obsession is that this is a European conflict and not a true global concern. As an April Economist article points out “particularly across the Middle East, and in Turkey, the West’s concern for Ukraine’s sovereignty is seen as self-serving and hypocritical, partly in light of America’s war in Iraq and the NATO-led bombing of Libya in 2011, which toppled its dictator, Muammar Qaddafi.”
* Iraq, and even Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have assessed more cost than benefit in standing with the West. Brazil’s president admires Putin, plus a fifth of its imported fertilizer comes from Russia. Brazil and Mexico balked at kicking Russia off the UN Human Rights Council and there is little appetite in Latin America for joining the sanctions. There is a growing affinity with Russia in Africa and almost half of African countries abstained or stayed away from the first UN vote censoring Russia.
* Putin’s aim is to fracture Western unity against Russia under the pressure of energy shortages, high prices, and economic headache
6) The continuing nuclear weapon fear (expansion of A4, B19 and C7 in original blog):
* I continue to note concerns regarding what Putin does when he’s in trouble, and that is escalation. And one escalation that could change the course of events would be nuclear, probably “only” tiny “tactical” nukes, as a bluff to squeeze some concessions out of the Ukrainians and hold NATO at bay. Hopefully NATO response will not include a nuclear response; just condemn (and let the world react) and continue military operations
* Canada, as a member of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, should challenge current nuclear orthodoxy by pressing for a shift in NATO’s nuclear rhetoric and get NATO to pledge that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.
7) War-crimes:
* On May 23 a captured Russian soldier was sentenced by a Ukrainian court to life in prison for killing a civilian. (The soldier claimed he was following orders). Ukrainian prosecutors are investigating thousands of potential war crimes such as the mass graves discovered in towns like Bucha
* Reading an April opinion piece in the Globe & Mail by Lloyd Axworthy (a former Canadian foreign minister) I more than ever realize the impact and symbolism of holding Putin and his accomplices accountable for their crimes. Axworthy talks about two lawyers (who ironically are Ukrainian) who were the originators of the concepts of crimes against humanity and genocide and who have influenced the creation of tribunals and courts in which prosecution for these international crimes can take place. These two men crystallized the idea that sovereignty does not confer on the state absolute authority; state power must be constrained by international standards of human rights. And it can work: just see what happened to Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic; he was initially defiant but after he was indicted as a war criminal, his tone changed. So shaming and prosecuting are effective tools in slowing the swagger and diminishing the hold of autocrats.
* The US has long been in opposition to the existing International Criminal Court (ICC) over worries that US troops could face prosecution there one day. There is also serious opposition in the US to entanglement in foreign wars. However this Putin war has engaged Americans in a way that other genocidal campaigns have not (40% of Americans believe the US should have a “major role” in ending Russian’s invasion; just 13% oppose). The US must be persuaded to move beyond the rhetoric of war crimes and into unconditional support for the ICC to quickly proceed toward the indictment of Putin. Put the power of law to work.
8) NATO purpose and a more logical explanation for Putin’s war:
* I covered this in my original blog, but it’s important to deal with again. There is a narrative circulating that it is the fault of the West that Putin invaded Ukraine. How so? This version of events has western countries expanded NATO eastward after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The story goes that Western leaders promised Russia as early as 1990 that they wouldn’t expand the alliance. So they violated that pledge by admitting Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in 1999, and seven more countries in 2004, including the Baltic states that were actually part of the Soviet empire.
* One problem with this flawed narrative is that eastern countries weren’t drafted by an aggressive NATO, they actively sought membership as a way of securing their hard won democracies and independence. Also, all had bitter experience with Russian domination. It’s the aggressive actions of Russia under Putin (and previous regimes) that has led eastern European countries to take shelter under NATO.
* Further proof can be seen with the recent movement by Finland and Sweden to join NATO, as they feel the only security they have lies in allying with the other 30 NATO members, whose cornerstone pledge is that an attack on one is an attack on all. In response, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, said “There can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic – the balance must be restored.” He then said that Finland and Sweden would have to live with nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles close to home.
* Cambridge Professor Dominic Lieven has proposed, in my opinion, one more and quite logical explanation for Putin’s war (expansion of A1, A12 and A13 in master blog). He suggests that the invasion of Ukraine is the belated revenge of the old Soviet security apparatus for what it sees as 30 years of humiliation, retreat and defeat. For the West the near-bloodless demise of Soviet communism was the final triumph of liberal values, but for the Russians, the 1990s was when their economy and political institutions disintegrated, life expectancy plummeted, and some 25 million ethnic Russians suddenly found themselves outside Russia’s borders. Russia was demoted from superpower to beggar. So it is unsurprising that many Russians love Putin.
* Lieven suggests that possession of Ukraine has long been essential to Russia’s existence as a great empire, so its succession in 1991 sealed the Soviet Union’s fate. Losing Crimea was a big hit – the great naval base in Sevastopol was vital to Russia’s power in the Black Sea region and had a unique place in Russia’s historical memory. Then when Ukraine was forced to choose between Russia and the West – as happened definitively in 2014 – disaster followed.
* Lieven feels that Putin’s initial strategy has failed and he will probably now attempt to conquer all the Donbas region and the land bridge between it and Crimea. If this succeeds, Ukraine will never accept this new border as a basis for long-term peace. This conflict could thus last in a semi-frozen state for decades, threatening international stability and might even escalate into nuclear confrontation.
9) Second guessing NATO’s pre-war support for Ukraine:
* In a bid to avoid provoking Moscow, many countries long declined to support Ukraine with weapons. But as a Globe & Mail editorial said “bullies pick fights they can win, not ones they know they’ll lose.” How differently things might have been if Ukraine had received all the weapons they are now receiving in the years after Russia’s 2014 invasion. Diplomacy and deterrence are not antagonists. In the right hands, strength can make war less likely, not more so. (Canada today is also underprepared to deter as they also lack the most advanced armaments.)
10) Revisiting root causes:
* There is a theme among those in countries around the world that exists among the less educated, less urban population. It’s one of pessimism for the present and a nostalgia for life in the imaginary better past and for not being left behind. I note it when reading campaign planks from such right wing ideologues as France’s Marine Le Pen. She wants to “restore French grandeur” and “return to Christendom”; she attacks migration, “cosmopolitans” and “globalists”. The irony is that French decline is a myth and the data shows it. The double irony is that her role model is Putin, a man who has somehow convinced many Russians that life was better in the totalitarian 1970s. Again, a myth.
11) Climate change consequences:
* All this talk of gas and crude oil supplies has focused attention on the reality that the world is still an enormous consumer (thus purchaser) of hydrocarbons. The actions needed in Europe to free themselves from Putin’s oil and gas tethers are clear; the complications are timing and cost. Just see Point 16 re the Green Party in Germany agreeing to reactivating coal production. (see D11 from original blog)
12) Religion again (expansion on A15 in original blog):
* The Vatican is taking what could be described (at best) as a naive approach to its relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church. Pope Francis has said in June that the Ukraine war was “perhaps somehow provoked.” He has been keen not to antagonize the Orthodox Patriarch Kirill (he sent a three-sentence note to him that made no mention of the war or even a generic appeal for peace) but, for goodness sake, Kirill has justified the invasion on spiritual and ideological grounds calling it a “metaphysical” battle with the West. He has blessed soldiers going into battle and invoked the idea that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. This is shameful.
* Another negative religious influence is taking place in Hungary. Prime Minister Vicktor Orban won a recent two-thirds majority that places the constitution in his hands. Along with almost full control over the media, and money flowing for influence, there is a strong religious undertone to his victory. A prominent Catholic priest, Zoltan Osztie (and a former national president of Hungary’s Association of Christian Intellectuals) has called Orban a pioneer and prophet, crediting him with upholding the three pillars of Hungarian society: God, homeland and family. Orban refuses to condemn Russian atrocities. His detractors describe him as a man who has ended the country’s brief dalliance with democracy. A US political scientist calls him “the Trojan horse of the Putin regime within the EU.”
13) Putin and his motives – one more time around
* Putin is trying to change the historical narrative of the last 100 years. He wants to make Ukraine and indeed the whole world conform to his version of history. He want to “correct” what he says is a historical injustice: the separation of Ukraine from Russia during the 1922 formation of the Soviet Union. As Foreign Affairs magazine wrote in their September/October issue, the irony of all this is since February 24 Putin’s insistence that Ukrainians who speak Russian are Russians has, on the contrary, helped to forge a new national identity in Ukraine centred on the Ukrainian language. The more that Putin tries to erase the Ukrainian national identity, the stronger it becomes. (I have dealt with the many Putin motives, depending upon the audience, in Attachment #1 of the original blog.)
14) Where is Canada?
* Canada was the first Western country to recognize Ukraine as an independent country in 1991. But it has acted inadequately since the start of the war. It was slow to send lethal weapons. It has approved the release of repaired turbines for Russia’s Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline on the basis that it was done to support Germany in the face of hardships caused by energy shortages. As Ukraine’s ambassador to Canada told a Commons’ committee, this flies in the face of international solidarity and only strengthens “Moscow’s sense of impunity.”
* Canada refused a request from Ukrainian staffers in our Kyiv embassy to relocate to safer ground if an invasion took place. It has not, inexplicably, as of writing, reopened its embassy in Kyiv.
* Canada has talked a good storm; at international meetings, we have been taking a symbolic stand against Russia’s war. Our international trade minister, Mary Ng, along with counterparts from the US, Australia, Japan and New Zealand walked out of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Group meeting on May 21 when the Russian minister for economic development started speaking. In April, Canada’s deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland took a similar action at the G20 meeting in Washington.
* Canada needs to revamp its national security, not just due to Russia, but China’s growing influence and intentions. This also needs to include examining the rise of the far right in Canada (plus the political polarization in the US). Canada should join AUKUS, the security pact between the US, Britain and Australia (if they will have us).
* Canada has recently announced beefing up security in its north. Over the next six years the government will spend $4.9B to modernize our aging defences, in particular upgrading NORAD plus a longer 20 year amount of $40 billion. (See E9 of original blog).
* Canada needs to give its oil industry freedom to crank up supplies – quickly – and get them to Europe, some even before winter. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with Trudeau on August 23 to sign a joint declaration on supplying (zero emissions) hydrogen by 2025. (Canada, by-the-way, has access to key hydrogen inputs of natural gas, hydro and offshore wind which should give us a leg up on the clean fuel of the future.) But what Germany really needs is LNG, which Canada has – but it’s out west (it’s some of the world’s least carbon-intensive; also when gas displaces coal – still widely used in Europe and Asia – it reduces greenhouse emissions.) So gas and hydrogen should not be seen as an either-or proposition.
* Canada has a notoriously slow-moving environment review process. (In 2016, the US had no LNG export capacity. Today it is the world’s largest LNG exporter! So it can be done if we open our world to investors.) We sit on huge stocks of both renewable and non-renewable energy. We can’t dictate what kind of energy the rest of the world chooses by trying to shut in our own fossil fuels. A successful energy transition requires a two-pronged system of developing renewables while pursuing the aggressive decarbonization of established energy sources.
15) Future predictions, military and otherwise:
* Ongoing sanctions will increase unrest inside Russia. Some four million Russians have left the country since the invasion, according to official figures; protests continue there with thousands jailed. Putin will have difficulty replenishing his forces with conscription or replacing equipment due to tech export bans against Moscow.
* Delivery is taking place of American and British long-range artillery, which will help to neutralize Russia’s military advantage. Professor of Military History Frederick W. Kagan wrote in Time Magazine: “The Russian military certainly cannot sustain the current offensive long enough and far enough to destroy the Ukrainian military or seize other major cities.”
* The war could expand to Russian territory. Anders Aslund a Swedish economist and author of books on Putin and Eastern Europe points out: “It is incomprehensible how the U.S. and other Western nations can insist on Ukrainian forces not attacking the scores of bases in Russia, from which the Russians bomb Ukraine. Ukraine must have the full right to defend itself against its attacker. The United Nations Charter (Article 51) states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’” By the way, Aslund believes Russia cannot win because its military is in disarray, because Putin is isolated and because he has not formulated a heroic or worthy goal to justify his war to the Russian people.
16) International consequence of Russia’s actions:
* The reality in Europe is that it is at war with Russia. Europe’s security may be compromised if both Germany’s and France’s policy toward Russia is undermined (and Italy’s coalition gets weak kneed over arms shipments to Ukraine). In Italy, Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s coalition is bitterly divided over sending arms shipments to Ukraine. In Berlin, the Green vice-chancellor and economy minister, Robert Habeck, announced the reopening of coal plants to offset Russia’s decision to sharply reduce gas supplies. Germany at some point has to abandon its Ostpolitik, or “eastern policy”, that is based on the idea of bringing Russia closer to Europe and ensuring the continent’s stability.
* One consequence of this war is the apprehension in Japan regarding what they should be doing to protect themselves from its own expansionist and aggressive neighbour, China. Japan is worried about the possibility of China taking military action over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Japan has also stepped up support for Taipei as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could involve strikes against US bases in Japan. This all has energized Japan to increase its military spending to at least the 2% or more of its GDP.
* Africa: According to the African Development Bank, wheat prices have risen by no less than 60% in recent months. To compound the shortages, there is likely to be a 2m-tonne deficit in fertilizers for African fields, resulting in a 20% smaller harvest.
17) Future diplomatic resolution; the possibility of escalation:
* Geopolitical heavyweights Henry Kissinger and George Soros squared off at the Davos conference recently with opposing strategies as to how to end the war. Kissinger, an old Cold Warrior and a Chamberlain in my opinion, believes that Ukraine should reach a compromise and cede territory to Russia to avoid marginalizing Putin and causing a full-blown world war. Soros, a philanthropist and democracy activist, believes Ukraine must be supplied with all the weaponry it needs because “the best and only way to preserve our civilization is to defeat Putin as soon as possible.” Their viewpoints represent extremes, but it’s up to Ukrainians whose views are best represented by Israel’s late Prime Minister Golda Meir, who was born in Kyiv. Negotiation is impossible, she said, when a neighbour is bent on extermination: “We (Israel) intend to remain alive. Our neighbours want to see us dead. This is not a question that leaves much room for compromise.” (Diane Francis, May 30 blog)
* Ukrainians themselves will be hard nosed about any resolution; a poll on May 24 showed that 82% of Ukrainians believe their country should not sign away any territory as part of a peace deal with Russia.
* It is apparent that US hesitancy has emerged into one of being less worried about the risks, and, as Lloyd Austin, America’s secretary of defence said “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it cannot do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”
* It looks like a long drawn-out stalemate. This is an existential conflict for both Ukraine and as well, Putin. However the risk of escalation should be considered high, in three areas. Firstly, escalation in the form of chemical and/or nuclear weapons. Secondly, escalation in the form of of Putin attacking the transhipment areas where supplies into Ukraine from the west are being assembled, mostly Poland. This would be considered an attack on a NATO and Article 5 would kick in. And finally a significant cyber attack by Russia on Europe and the US, likely the banking system. The big question will be how the US will respond. The way President Biden has positioned this conflict makes the war also an existential one for the Americans. Will he put boots on the ground if any of the above escalation actions occur?
My covering letter to this blog summarized how I feel this catastrophe resonates. Here, again, are the points I made:
- A hellish and unjustified bombardment is obliterating parts of a free country. The civilized world has no other moral choice but to show outrage and continue to take action supporting Ukraine. The norms of territorial integrity have been disregarded by Putin; this must not be tolerated nor forgiven.
- It’s likely that Russia is stuck in an un-winnable war. It is a case study in a failure of supreme command, typical of an autocratic leader who believes in his own propaganda. Putin is fighting a population that is not inclined to be “liberated”. His commanders and troops surely sense the futility of the fight with the consequent reduction in morale and discipline; it’s hard to command forces to act in support of a delusion. The Ukrainians are defending their territory against an enemy intent on destroying their land.
- I remain firm on concluding that Putin must go. ALL of the accounts I have read about the man paint a picture of a dangerous, cruel and predatory person – with the powers of a major state at his disposal. He wants to rule for life without challenge, and for Russians to accept kleptocracy and cruelty as normal. He prepared for this war by sanction-proofing the Russian economy, stepping up repression, conducting targeted assassinations and imprisoning opponents, carriing out disinformation operations and engaging in efforts to bribe and blackmail politicians abroad. He’s even bragged that he has “bought the West”. (See D2, D3 of original blog.)
- The war has to be won by Ukraine; this means weaponry and money from the west. Sanctions must be both adhered to plus stepped up to sink the Russian economy. I have shifted my opinion on the issue of making peace with Putin – it will be extremely difficult and must be done with military might – the language he understands (see D2, D3 of original blog). The more you concede, the more emboldened Putin becomes. Putin’s goal now appears not one of negotiation, but Ukrainian capitulation. (That’s why the Canadian government approving the release of repaired turbines for Russia’s Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline is unacceptable.)
- Putin’s actions are weaponizing energy and food to destabilize the European continent, and the rest of the world. In the more vulnerable parts of the world it is now a matter of real food supply – vs starvation (see C12 from original blog).
- The deeply flawed economic model in Europe based on cheap Russian gas is now being scrapped. Now is summer; however winter is coming and the scramble for energy is getting serious, particularly if Putin starts to put the screws on gas flows (see D10 in original blog).
- Inflation, and interest rate hikes, economic contraction plus a costly global competition to acquire energy is disrupting consumers. Simple consumer interests will focus on gasoline and food prices and may influence how politicians act. (This will play out further as Americans, Germans and Italians go to the polls this year.)
- Certain other key countries are acting in shameful self-serving ways, particularly India (which hasn’t imposed sanctions and have bought extra Russian oil) plus Pakistan and Brazil. Others as expected are Russian sycophants (Syria, North Korea, Belarus, Eritrea) or opportunists (China, Turkey, South Africa and to an extent, Hungary). See my updated notes in Attachments 20 and 21.
- The Russian people are cocooned by Putin’s propaganda; so are some other parts of the world (e.g. some African and South American states).
- The risk of escalation should be considered high in three area. Firstly, chemical and/or nuclear weapons. Secondly, Putin attacking the transhipment areas where supplies into Ukraine from the west are being assembled, mostly Poland. This would be considered an attack on a NATO and Article 5 would kick in. And thirdly, a significant cyber attack by Russia on Europe and the US.
- I believe Putin has made a huge miscalculation that will play out in disaster for his country. Ironically in the short term the war has been economically advantageous to Russia as the throttling back of gas and oil flows have resulted in higher prices and greater income to Putin’s war treasury. However, Western sanctions along with brain and capital drains will hollow out the country. This may be best for the world – a significantly diminished Russia.
- It was Napoleon who said “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake”, so – so be it. The history of this brutish country (never mind its Tchaikovsky and Bolshoi, its athletic, science and space accomplishments, and so on) has made it a continuing threat to a peaceful world. Putin epitomizes the Stalinism era of the old Soviet Union; it was an evil regime and deserved to fail. The Russian regime, in trying to destroy Ukraine, has destroyed a chance, at least for many years to come, for a better world. This saddens and maddens me.
- Putin is fighting not just to re-create the Soviet Union, but to undermine the idea of democratic transition, that you can escape autocracy and adopt something better. He doesn’t just want Ukrainians to drop their dream of stability and integration into Europe. He wants everybody else – Georgians, Kazakhs, Balts, Moldovans, and many others – to drop it too. The fact that democracy can mean good governance, good economic results, and improved living standards is one that Putin and his Russian mentality seeks to thwart. (See A7 that emphasizes the reality that the Russian autocratic model does not stand up to a rules based, civil liberty democratic model).
- I feel a flush of irony when I write these words. US, the world’s great beacon for democracy, has as one of its only two political parties, one that no longer believes in the rule of law, or democracy. Election denialism has become almost mandatory in the Republican Party. As the Globe & Mail said on August 17 “even politicians who would rather see Trump ride off into the sunset feel compelled to defend him against any and all accusations…Once the party of law and order and small government, it now sounds like the party of anti-law, disorder and no government.” (The other irony is that this mentality is creeping north under the guise of Pierre Poilievre, with the same resentment-based politics of the Trump GOP.)
- My prognosis is that the territory the Russians have gobbled up will prove too difficult to hold; they have an unwilling populace that will prey upon Russians soldiers. Bit by bit Ukraine will retake territory through the use of long range missiles, drone warfare, and insurgents/saboteurs – and a vigorous nationalism. Ukraine will resist with all its resources the likely attempt by Russia to take Odessa and other Black Sea ports (which would leave Ukraine an economically inviolable, landlocked country). There is a real likelihood that Ukraine will fight to get back the Crimea, lost in 2014, and will attempt to retake other lost territory. However, at this time there is little evidence that it has the ability to mount a major offensive. So it’s likely the next few months (and perhaps years) will grind on. That’s why de-heading the snake is the best solution.